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BOUYID V BELGIUM: THE ‘MINIMUM LEVEL OF SEVERITY’ AND HUMAN 




The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an 
important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium.  In Bouyid, the 
Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and 
an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case, the Grand Chamber 
ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that 
the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian 
police; it found that there had been a breach of the investigative duty under Article 3 
also. In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the 
majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the 
question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the 
disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level 
of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form 
of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold, seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute 
character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type 
applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression.  I 
consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the 
concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of 
Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of 
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The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights recently delivered an 
important judgment on Article 3 ECHR in the case of Bouyid v Belgium.1 In Bouyid, the 
Grand Chamber was called upon to consider whether slaps inflicted on a minor and 
                                                          
* Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast – n.mavronicola@qub.ac.uk. I am grateful to Ed Bates, 
Stephen Riley, Stijn Smet, Clive Walker and others who commented on Strasbourg Observers and 
academia.edu, for a fruitful exchange, and to Leto Cariolou for helpful comments. All errors are, of 
course, my own. 
1 Bouyid v Belgium (Application no 23380/09), Judgment of 28 September 2015 [Grand Chamber]. 
References to ‘the ECtHR’ or ‘the Court’ in this judgment are references to the findings of the majority 
of the Grand Chamber. The dissenting judgments are discussed separately and clearly distinguished. 
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an adult in police custody were in breach of Article 3 ECHR, which provides that ‘No 
one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’. Overruling the Chamber judgment in the case,2 the Grand Chamber 
ruled by 14 votes to 3 that there had been a substantive violation of Article 3 in that 
the applicants had been subjected to degrading treatment by members of the Belgian 
police. The Grand Chamber unanimously found that there had been a breach of the 
investigative duty under Article 3 also. 
 
In this comment, I focus on the fundamental basis of disagreement between the 
majority of the Grand Chamber and those who found themselves in dissent, on the 
question of whether there had been a substantive breach of Article 3. The crux of the 
disagreement lay in the understanding and application of the test of ‘minimum level 
of severity’, which the ECtHR has established as decisive of whether a particular form 
of ill-treatment crosses the Article 3 threshold,3 seen also in light of Article 3’s absolute 
character, which makes it non-displaceable – that is, immune to trade-offs of the type 
applicable in relation to qualified rights such as privacy and freedom of expression.4 
I consider the way the majority of the Grand Chamber unpacked and applied the 
concept of dignity – or ‘human dignity’ – towards finding a substantive breach of 
Article 3, and briefly distil some of the principles underpinning the understanding of 
human dignity emerging in the Court’s analysis.  
 
There have been increasing references to human dignity in the interpretation of Article 
3 in some prominent judgments of the Grand Chamber, notably in Vinter v UK,5 where 
the Court found that the imposition of sentences of whole life imprisonment without 
the prospect of release through a suitable review mechanism constituted a breach of 
Article 3 ECHR; and Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia,6 where the Court found that the 
practice of keeping remand prisoners in a metal cage during court hearings amounted 
to degrading treatment in breach of Article 3 ECHR. To those who see human dignity 
as a nebulous or unduly malleable concept,7 this may not be an entirely welcome 
development. Nonetheless, as I suggest below, there is good reason to view the 
Court’s reasoning and the particular instantiation of human dignity that it puts 
                                                          
2 Bouyid v Belgium (Application no 23380/09), Judgment of 21 November 2013 [Fifth Section]. 
3 See Ireland v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25, para 162; Pretty v UK (2002) 35 EHRR 1; the threshold is 
discussed in Natasa Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”? Deciphering absoluteness in the context 
of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ (2012) 12(4) Human Rights Law Review 723, 
749. 
4 Mavronicola, ‘What is an “absolute right”?’, ibid 734-735. Cf Steven Greer, ‘Is the Prohibition against 
Torture, Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment Really “Absolute” in International Human Rights 
Law?’ (2015) 15 (1) Human Rights Law Review 101. 
5 Vinter and others v UK (Applications nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10), Judgment of 9 July 2013 
[Grand Chamber]. 
6 Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia (Applications nos 32541/08 and 43441/08), Judgment of 17 July 2014 
[Grand Chamber]. 
7 The literature on the subject is vast and ever-growing; consider Christopher McCrudden, ‘Human 
Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ 19(4) European Journal of International Law 655; cf 
Paolo G. Carozza, ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply’ (2008) 19(5) 
European Journal of International Law 931. See also Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Understanding Human 
Dignity (OUP 2013).  
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forward as appropriate and, indeed, promising in terms of elucidating the Court’s 
reasoning on Article 3 ECHR.  
 
As the Human Rights Centre at Ghent University, who acted as third party 
interveners, highlighted: 
 
The Grand Chamber judgment in Bouyid may well become a decisive 
moment in the Court’s case law  on  the  interpretation  of  the  notions  of  
torture and  inhuman  or  degrading  treatment under Article  3  ECHR  
and,  as  a  result,  on  the  extent  of  the  protection  offered  against  police 
violence  under  the  Convention. In this respect, we submit that the 
judgment of the Fifth Section in Bouyid unacceptably lowers the standard 
of protection against police  violence traditionally  offered  by Article 3  
ECHR  and  urge  the  Grand  Chamber  to  reconsider  the threshold 
question under Article 3 ECHR by paying particular attention to the 
importance of elements  that  were  ignored  by  the  Fifth  Section, namely 
the abuse of power by police officers over  persons  who are  under  their 
complete control and  therefore in  a state  of vulnerability.8 
 
As I argue below, the majority’s findings in Bouyid rightly heeded the forceful points 
made in this submission. Nonetheless, whilst the argument made by in the 
submissions of the Human Rights Centre at Ghent University was that in instances of 
police abuse of their powers – as was the case at issue – the threshold of severity 
should be lowered, I argue that the minimum threshold of severity remained constant 
– and was rightly found to have been crossed. 
 
2. Facts, submissions and findings 
 
The case concerned two young men, one of whom was 17 at the time the events took 
place, who alleged that they had been slapped in the face once by local police officers 
while they were detained at a police station. The young men claimed to have been 
victims of degrading treatment. They further complained that the investigation into 
their complaints had been ineffective.9 The Court examined the complaints solely 
under Article 3 ECHR. 
 
The allegations that the young men had been slapped had been disputed by the police 
officers concerned. Nonetheless, the ECtHR’s Grand Chamber found the facts as 
alleged by the applicants to be sufficiently proven for the purposes of considering 
whether Article 3 ECHR had been breached.  
 
In its judgment, the Fifth Section Chamber of the ECtHR had referred to the principle 
that in order for ill-treatment to fall within the scope of Article 3 it had to attain a 
                                                          
8 Bouyid v Belgium (Application no 23380/09), Third Party Intervention of Human Rights Centre of 
Ghent University, available at http://www.hrc.ugent.be/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Bouyid.pdf, 
accessed 22 October 2015 (emphasis in original). 
9 Bouyid [Grand Chamber] (n 1) para 54. 
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‘minimum level of severity’ and had suggested that some forms of violence, although 
morally condemnable and likely domestically unlawful, would not fall within Article 
3.10 The Chamber had then found that the acts complained of by the applicants would 
not, in the circumstances of the case, constitute treatment in breach of Article 3, 
concluding as follows: 
 
Even supposing that the slapping took place, in both cases it was an 
isolated slap inflicted thoughtlessly by a police officer who was 
exasperated by the applicants’ disrespectful or provocative conduct, 
without seeking to make them confess. Moreover, there was apparently an 
atmosphere of tension between the members of the applicants’ family and 
police officers in their neighbourhood. In those circumstances, even though 
one of the applicants was only 17 at the time and whilst it is comprehensible 
that, if the events really took place as the applicants described, they must 
have felt deep resentment, the Court cannot ignore the fact that these were 
one-off occurrences in a situation of nervous tension and without any 
serious or long-term effect. It takes the view that acts of this type, though 
unacceptable, cannot be regarded as generating a sufficient degree of 
humiliation or debasement for a breach of Article 3 of the Convention to be 
established. In other words, in any event, the above-mentioned threshold 
of severity has not been reached in the present case, such that no question 
of a violation of that provision, under either its substantive or its procedural 
head, arises.11 
The majority of 14 judges at the Grand Chamber disagreed with the Fifth Section of 
the Court on this. They were persuaded to depart from the Chamber’s finding after 
rigorously reasoned arguments not only by the applicants’ counsel but also by two 
third-party observations by the Human Rights Centre at Ghent University12 and by 
REDRESS Trust.13 
Arguing that the Court should find a substantive breach of Article 3 ECHR, the 
applicants complained that the Court’s Fifth Section wrongly departed from a 
presumption of breach of Article 3 at the hands of State agents in circumstances where 
an individual emerges with injuries sustained in detention. They also argued that 
where a person is deprived of his or her liberty, the use of physical force against them 
inherently infringes human dignity and is presumed to be incompatible with Article 
3 – a presumption which can only be rebutted by proving that the use of force had 
been made strictly necessary by the victim’s actions. This had not been shown by the 
police, according to the applicants. They argued that tensions between their family 
and the local police, which had indeed been present, did not establish a need for use 
                                                          
10 Bouyid [Fifth Section] (n 2) paras 43-48. 
11 Ibid, para 51. 
12 See n 8 above. 
13 Bouyid v Belgium (Application no 23380/09), Third Party Intervention of REDRESS, available at: 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/bouyid-v-belgium-redress-intervention-18.07.2014.pdf, 
accessed 22 October 2015. 
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of force. They also made reference to reports indicating that police violence was rife 
in Belgium.14 
The applicants also argued that there had been a procedural breach of Article 3 in that 
the investigation conducted into their allegations did not meet the requirements of the 
ECtHR’s case law on the investigative duty under Article 3. A number of 
shortcomings in the investigation were set out, including the omission of pertinent 
evidence from the file and non-disclosure of certain evidence to the applicants. 
On the other hand, the Belgian government argued that, while it could be accepted 
that a rebuttable presumption of a causal link between injuries occurring in custody 
and police actions applied, and that the police actions could be presumed to be serious 
when inflicted on someone in custody, there had been no reason to call the police 
officers’ statements into question in the context of the ‘thorough’ – as the government 
alleged – investigation conducted,15 particularly in light of the presumption of 
innocence.16 The Belgian government argued that the fact that prosecution had not 
been pursued on evidentiary grounds in this instance did not undermine the principle 
that any recourse to physical force that was not made necessary by the person’s own 
conduct diminished human dignity and would in principle constitute a violation of 
Article 3.17 It further insisted that there had been an effective official investigation 
which had not established that the facts alleged by the applicants had occurred,18 and 
that the case should not therefore be seen as an exemplary case tackling police 
violence.19 
The Human Rights Centre of the University of Ghent noted in their submissions that 
the Fifth Section of the Court, in reaching the conclusion that the Article 3 severity 
threshold had not been reached, had taken into account allegations of the applicants’ 
provocative behaviour, the tensions between the Bouyid family and the local police,  
the fact that the slaps had not been aimed at eliciting confessions and that they had 
taken place as isolated acts and had had no serious long-term effects on the applicants. 
The Human Rights Centre argued that the first three factors outlined were irrelevant 
in light of the Court’s case law on Article 3. It then suggested that whilst the fourth 
factor outlined was relevant, the fact of police officers abusing their power against a 
person deprived of his liberty should lead to the severity threshold being lowered, not 
least in light of that person’s helplessness and consequent vulnerability. This was 
especially so in the case of minors deprived of their liberty. It also highlighted the 
prevalence of such police violence in Belgium as an issue which required addressing.  
REDRESS submitted that use of physical force by law enforcement agents was only 
allowed under international human rights law when no more than necessary, 
referring to an array of legal materials. It stressed the ECtHR’s own principle that any 
                                                          
14 Bouyid [Grand Chamber] (n 1) para 59. 
15 Ibid, para 66. 
16 Ibid, para 67. 
17 Ibid, para 70. 
18 Ibid, para 71. 
19 Ibid, para 72. 
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recourse to force against someone deprived of liberty which had not been made 
strictly necessary by that person’s conduct diminished human dignity and was in 
principle in breach of Article 3.20 The use of force in such circumstances 
straightforwardly reached the minimum level of severity according to REDRESS, in 
light of individuals’ particular vulnerability when under the complete control of the 
authorities. REDRESS also stressed the double vulnerability of minors in detention, as 
highlighted by multiple actors and sources, including the Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture.21  
The Grand Chamber set out certain general principles before applying them to the 
facts at issue. It reiterated that Article 3 of the ECHR enshrines one of the most 
fundamental values of a democratic society and that, unlike other Convention rights, 
it is an absolute right in that it is not conditional on the individual’s good behaviour, 
unqualified (making no provision for exceptions) and non-derogable, even in the fight 
against terrorism and organised crime.22 It also stated that ‘the prohibition of torture 
and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is a value of civilisation closely 
bound up with respect for human dignity’.23 It pointed out that whilst in principle the 
standard of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is adopted for proving the facts that constitute 
an Article 3 breach, strong inferences or ‘similar unrebutted presumptions of fact’ may 
be adequate.24 Such strong presumptions will arise in particular where the events lie 
in the exclusive knowledge of the State authorities, which is the case in relation to 
persons in custody – following its long-standing case law on this, the Court indicated 
that the burden of proof is then on the government to provide a satisfactory 
explanation of injuries occurring in detention and cast doubt on the account offered 
by the victim. As the Court said, this is justified in light of the vulnerable position in 
which persons in custody find themselves.25 This principle applies to any 
circumstances in which a person is ‘under the control of the police or a similar 
authority’, as the Court said.26 Finally, the ECtHR reiterated that it has to apply a 
‘particularly thorough scrutiny’ where there are allegations of an Article 3 breach.27 
Turning to the substantive contours of the ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 ECHR, 
the Court restated its oft-repeated test that ‘[i]ll-treatment must attain a minimum 
level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3’ and that ‘assessment of this 
minimum depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the 
treatment, its physical or mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim’.28 The Court indicated that other relevant factors could include 
                                                          
20 Ibid, para 78. See, on this, Natasa Mavronicola, ‘Güler and Öngel v Turkey: Article 3 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Strasbourg’s Discourse on the Justified Use of Force’ (2013) 76(2) 
Modern Law Review 370. 
21 Bouyid [Grand Chamber], ibid, para 79. 
22 Ibid, para 81. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid, para 82. 
25 Ibid, para 83. 
26 Ibid, para 84. 
27 Ibid, para 85. 
28 Ibid, para 86. For critical comment (and selected case law) on this test, see Mavronicola, ‘What is an 
“absolute right”?’ (n 3). 
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the purpose, intention or motivation behind a treatment,29 although an absence of an 
intent to humiliate or otherwise harm does not rule out an Article 3 breach;30 and that 
regard must be had to context, including an ‘atmosphere of heightened tension and 
emotions’.31 The Court then recounted indicators of Article 3 ill-treatment, suggesting 
that in order for ill-treatment to reach the minimum level of severity it must usually 
involve ‘actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering’;32 yet it 
proceeded to suggest that even in the absence of these aspects, treatment which 
‘humiliates or debases an individual showing a lack of respect for or diminishing his 
or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of 
breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance’, the Court may find it 
degrading and thus in breach of Article 3.33 The Court added that it may be enough 
that the victim is humiliated in her own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others,34 thus 
highlighting that degradation may relate to the particular sensibilities of the victim. 
With clear relevance to the facts of the case, the Court made the following statement: 
[T]he Court considers it particularly important to point out that, in respect 
of a person who is deprived of his liberty, or, more generally, is confronted 
with law-enforcement officers, any recourse to physical force which has not 
been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human 
dignity and is, in principle, an infringement of the right set forth in Article 
3.35 
Turning its attention to the value of dignity, the ECtHR posited that, despite the 
Convention not mentioning dignity explicitly,36 ‘the Court has emphasised that 
respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the 
Convention…alongside human freedom’.37 It indicated that ‘there is a particularly 
strong link between the concepts of “degrading” treatment or punishment within the 
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention and respect for “dignity”’, a point made by the 
Commission in East African Asians v UK,38 and by the Court in Tyrer v UK39 and 
repeated a number of times thereafter. As the Court reminded us, the latter case 
involved a finding of degrading punishment in the birching of the applicant because 
he had been treated as ‘an object in the power of the authorities’ and this was ‘an 
                                                          
29 Ibid, para 86, citing inter alia Egmez v Cyprus (2002) 34 EHRR 29, para 78; and Krastanov v Bulgaria 
(2005) 41 EHRR 50, para 53. 
30 Ibid, para 86. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid, para 87. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, para 88, citations omitted. 
36 Ibid, para 89. The Court nonetheless highlighted that human dignity is mentioned in the Preamble to 
Protocol No. 13 of the Convention, which prohibits the death penalty in all circumstances. 
37 Ibid, para 89, citing – among other authorities – Pretty v UK (n 3). 
38 Ibid, para 90, citing East African Asians v UK (1995) 19 EHRR CD1. 
39 Tyrer v UK (1979-80) 2 EHRR 1. 
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assault on precisely that which is one of the main purposes of Article 3 to protect, 
namely a person’s dignity and physical integrity’.40  
Moving on to the application of these principles to the facts at hand, the Court gave 
short shrift to the Belgian Government’s disputing of the facts and found that the 
marks on, and psychological condition of, the applicants as attested by medical 
certificates were consistent with the applicants’ allegations of having been slapped 
while being interrogated in the police station. Noting the ‘major shortcomings in the 
investigation’,41 on which the Court made a finding of breach of the investigative duty 
under Article 3 ECHR,42 the Court found it was impossible to conclude that the police 
officers’ denials constituted the accurate version of events. The Court then returned to 
the principle that where an individual is deprived of liberty or confronted with law-
enforcement officials, the officials’ use of physical force which has not been made 
necessary by her conduct ‘diminishes human dignity and is in principle an 
infringement of…Article 3’.43 It sought to emphasise that the words ‘in principle’ did 
not entail that there were any situations in which recourse to physical force in such 
circumstances could be Article 3-compatible on the basis of not reaching the severity 
threshold. For the Court, ‘[a]ny interference with human dignity strikes at the very 
essence of the Convention’.44 Thus: 
…any conduct by law-enforcement officers vis-à-vis an individual which 
diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation of Article 3 of the 
Convention. That applies in particular to their use of physical force against 
an individual where it is not made strictly necessary by his conduct, 
whatever the impact on the person in question.45 
Given that the Belgian Government had never accepted that the slaps had been 
inflicted, it had not made a case for the slaps having been made strictly necessary by 
the applicants’ conduct – rather, it appeared that the slaps were impulsive responses 
to what was perceived to be the applicants’ disrespectful attitude, which was 
‘certainly insufficient to establish such necessity’.46 The Court therefore found that the 
applicants’ dignity had been undermined and there had been a breach of Article 3 
ECHR.47 
Some general remarks followed, with the Court emphasising that ‘in any event’ a slap 
by a law-enforcement agent of an individual under his control is a ‘serious attack on 
the individual’s dignity’,48 and has a ‘considerable impact’ on the person on whom it 
is inflicted, particularly given the importance which the face can have in human 
                                                          
40 Ibid, para 33, cited in Bouyid [Grand Chamber] (n 1) para 90. 
41 Bouyid [Grand Chamber], ibid para 96.  
42 Ibid, paras 124-134. 
43 Ibid, para 101. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid, para 102. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid, para 103. 
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interaction.49 Moreover, the Court noted that ‘even one unpremeditated slap devoid 
of any serious or long-term effect on the person receiving it may be perceived as 
humiliating by that person’.50 The Court emphasised that this is particularly the case 
when the slap is inflicted by law-enforcement officials on persons under the officials’ 
control ‘because it highlights the superiority and inferiority which by definition 
characterise the relationship between the former and the latter in such circumstances’ 
and such unlawful and immoral act may arouse in these persons ‘a feeling of arbitrary 
treatment, injustice and powerlessness’.51 The Court then proceeded to make a point 
about vulnerability worth quoting in full:  
Moreover, persons who are held in police custody or are even simply taken 
or summoned to a police station for an identity check or questioning – as in 
the applicants’ case – and more broadly all persons under the control of the 
police or a similar authority, are in a situation of vulnerability. The 
authorities are consequently under a duty to protect them… In inflicting 
the humiliation of being slapped by one of their officers they are flouting 
this duty.52 
Importantly, the Court then moved on to reject the Chamber’s approach in relation to 
the victims’ allegedly disrespectful or provocative conduct and the exasperation and 
‘thoughtlessness’ of the police officers’ reaction, calling these factors ‘irrelevant’.53 The 
Court premised this point on the absolute character of the right enshrined in Article 
3, which prohibits torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment 
irrespective of the conduct of the victim. This is crucial: the slap constituted an assault 
on the victims’ human dignity, contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, in amounting to 
gratuitous violence inflicted on a vulnerable person in the control of the authorities; 
the idea that the wrongfulness of this slap was somehow mitigated by factors relating 
to the unpalatable prior behaviour of the victims was dismissed because it did not in 
any way alter the character of the wrong committed. The Court proceeded to highlight 
that Article 3 ECHR ‘establishes a positive obligation on the State to train its law-
enforcement officials in such a manner as to ensure…that no one is subjected to torture 
or treatment that runs counter to that provision’.54  
Finally, it highlighted ‘as a secondary consideration’ that the first applicant in Bouyid 
had been a minor (17 years of age) and thus liable to be even more vulnerable, 
                                                          
49 Ibid, para 104. The Court here mentioned S.A.S. v France (Application no. no. 43835/11), Judgment of 
1 July 2014, a mention which is noted critically in Stijn Smet, ‘Bouyid v. Belgium: Grand Chamber 
Decisively Overrules Unanimous Chamber’, Strasbourg Observers, 1 October 2015, available at: 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2015/10/01/bouyid-v-belgium-grand-chamber-decisively-
overrules-unanimous-chamber/, accessed 22 October 2015. 
50 Ibid, para 105. 
51 Ibid, para 106, citing Petyo Petkov v Bulgaria (Application no 32130/03), Judgment of 7 January 2010, 
paras 42 and 47. 
52 Bouyid [Grand Chamber], ibid, para 107. 
53 Ibid, para 108. 




especially in psychological terms, to such ill-treatment.55 The Court made a general 
statement that certain behaviour towards minors may be incompatible with Article 3 
ECHR because they are minors, even if it might be found acceptable in the case of 
adults, and that law-enforcement officers must therefore ‘show greater vigilance and 
self-control when dealing with minors’.56 
Nonetheless, the Court found that the slaps had amounted to a breach of Article 3 as 
inflicted on both the adult and the minor member of the Bouyid family in amounting 
to recourse to physical force which had not been made strictly necessary by their 
conduct, thus diminishing their dignity. It distinguished the ill-treatment from 
inhuman treatment and torture in that it had not resulted in notable bodily injuries or 
serious mental or physical suffering, and found that it had constituted degrading 
treatment.57 
The Court also found that the investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment had 
been inadequate, in breach of the procedural positive obligation under Article 3 to 
investigate credible allegations of ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 and to do so 
effectively.58 This was a unanimous finding. This comment does not focus on this 
aspect of the judgment. 
3. The dissent’s focal points 
 
The dissenting opinion of Judges De Gaetano (Malta), Lemmens (Belgium) and 
Mahoney (UK), who disagreed with the substantive finding of a breach of Article 3, 
was strongly worded. Whilst they endorsed the general principles set out by the 
majority in paragraphs 81-90 of the Grand Chamber judgment and took it as given 
that the applicants had been slapped while under police control, they did not agree 
with the majority that this could be characterized as degrading treatment in breach of 
Article 3. Although unacceptable, they said, and likely to constitute a breach of 
professional ethics, as well as a tort or criminal offence ‘in a democratic society’,59 this 
treatment did not attain the minimum level of severity required to cross the Article 3 
threshold.60 This was so despite the slap amounting to an interference with human 
dignity, as they saw it: ‘there are forms of treatment which, while interfering with 
human dignity, do not attain the minimum level of severity required to fall within the 
scope of Article 3’.61 For these three judges, that was the very point of the words ‘in 
principle’ whenever the Court has reiterated that where the use of physical force 
diminishes human dignity, it will ‘in principle’ constitute a breach of Article 3.62 The 
                                                          
55 Ibid, para 109. 
56 Ibid, para 110. 
57 Ibid, paras 111-112. The distinction between inhuman treatment and degrading treatment on the basis 
of tangible injury can be contested – I consider this further in Natasa Mavronicola, Torture, Inhumanity 
and Degradation under Article 3 of the ECHR: Absolute Rights and Absolute Wrongs (Hart Publishing, 
forthcoming in 2016). 
58 Ibid, paras 114-134. 
59 Ibid, Dissenting Opinion of Judges De Gaetano, Lemmens and Mahoney, para 3.  
60 Ibid, para 5-7. 




dissenting judges cited Ireland v UK, in which the ECtHR had asserted that there can 
be ‘violence which is to be condemned both on moral grounds and also in most cases 
under the domestic law of the Contracting States but which does not fall within Article 
3 of the Convention’.63 The dissenting judges were at times deeply scathing of the 
majority’s reasoning. Three focal points of criticism are worth mentioning.  
 
First, the dissenters were critical of the majority’s approach to the Court’s role in 
Article 3 cases, suggesting that ‘[i]t is not for the Court to impose general rules of 
conduct on law-enforcement officers; instead, its task is limited to examining the 
applicants’ individual situation to the extent that they allege that they were personally 
affected by the treatment complained of’.64 They considered rather that it was crucial 
to focus on the specific circumstances of the case and assess them ex post facto, not to 
adopt what they called the ‘eminently dogmatic position’ that ‘any conduct by law-
enforcement officers which diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation of 
Article 3, irrespective of its impact on the person concerned’.65 
 
Secondly, the dissenters criticised what they saw as the majority’s haphazard 
references to (human) dignity, suggesting that whilst they were prepared to accept 
that the slaps inflicted on the applicants diminished human dignity, the majority’s 
references to a range of documents and other sources relating to dignity provided ‘no 
indication of how the notion of human dignity is to be understood’.66 Interestingly, 
this critique seems to stand fundamentally at odds with the prior critique: the 
dissenting judges first stand against an approach which seeks to provide general 
principles regarding the sort of treatment which will be found to be contrary to Article 
3 in ex ante fashion, and at the same time challenge the majority’s failure to unpack the 
value of human dignity and what it entails for our understanding of the terms of 
Article 3.  
 
The final, and most forcefully made, criticism is against what the dissenters branded 
the ‘trivialising’ of findings of Article 3 ill-treatment.67 The dissenters expressed 
concern that the majority’s judgment ‘may impose an unrealistic standard by 
rendering meaningless the requirement of a minimum level of severity for acts of 
violence by law-enforcement officers’.68 The dissenters argued that this unduly high 
standard did not show proper appreciation of the difficulties that police may face in 
real-life situations and which may ‘cause them to lose their temper’.69 Given that the 
situation complained of, according to the dissenters, presented a treatment that was 
‘far less serious’ than ill-treatment in other cases the Court had unfortunately had to 
deal with, the Courts’ findings and conclusions risked ‘being completely at odds with 
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reality’.70 They argued that ‘a more nuanced assessment of the facts of the case, with 
a stronger grounding in reality’, which should have yielded a finding of no violation 
of Article 3.71 With this criticism, the dissenters were calling openly for factors such as 
the provocation of police by the victims and the limited concrete injury sustained by 
the victims to count towards finding that the threshold of severity was not crossed; 
more implicitly, they seem to have been calling for the majority to acknowledge the 
frequent, seemingly pedestrian (or pedestrianised by the dissenters) occurrence of 
such violence as a basis for not finding it to be a breach of Article 3. 
 
Aside from the self-contradiction arising in the criticism outlined above, namely in 
accusing the majority of being overly principled whilst at the same time attacking 
them for their lack of principled engagement with dignity, there is a more insidious 
quality to what the dissenting judges appear to be saying. It lies in their association of 
‘is’ with ‘ought’. The argument appears to proceed as follows:  
 
1. Article 3 is an absolute right, admitting of no displacement or trade-offs, 
and must therefore be seen as proscribing ill-treatment which we are not 
prepared to countenance. 
2. Slaps in police custody occur and are likely to occur very often. 
3. Given that slaps in police custody occur and are likely to continue to 
occur very often, we ought to be prepared to countenance them. 
4. Slaps in police custody therefore ought not to be found to be in breach of 
Article 3.  
 
The problem with this argument is that the jump from 2 to 3 and then to 4 is one from 
‘is’ to ‘ought’: because X (in this case, gratuitous violence against someone in custody) 
is a frequent occurrence, X ought not to be cast as an absolute wrong. This is a 
problematic way to reason Article 3: torture is torture, and inhuman treatment is 
inhuman treatment, and degrading treatment is degrading treatment, irrespective of 
how frequently they might occur in the potentially sinister workings of our State 
machinery. Moreover, as I argue below, the dissenters’ substantive reasoning beyond 
this ‘is’-‘ought’ jump does a poor job of pinning down the contours of the ‘severity’ of 
ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 and applying it to the case at hand. 
 
Nonetheless, the critique regarding the majority’s opaque references to and reliance 
on (human) dignity is largely well-grounded. Below, I offer some ideas of how to 
understand the way human dignity informs the majority finding in Bouyid. 
 
 
4. The ‘minimum level of severity’ and dignity 
 
In Bouyid, following a line of similar pronouncements in earlier case law, the majority 
of the Grand Chamber placed human dignity squarely in the centre of Article 3 and 
indeed suggested that ‘respect for human dignity forms part of the very essence of the 
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Convention’.72 According to the Grand Chamber, there is a ‘particularly strong link 
between the concepts of “degrading” treatment or punishment within the meaning of 
Article 3 of the Convention and respect for “dignity”’.73 The Court did this after 
alluding to a number of international and regional human rights instruments and 
related documents which refer to dignity, including Protocol 13 to the ECHR, which 
abolishes the death penalty.74 
 
What the Court appears to be saying is that Article 3 prohibits absolutely certain 
attacks on human dignity, which is a value that underpins the Convention, although 
not explicitly mentioned in its text. Moreover, the concept of human dignity in the 
Grand Chamber’s reasoning is both sensitive to the particular relational factors that 
determine the character of a particular treatment – factors which go to the iniquity of 
the perpetrator’s act and the vulnerability of the victim’s circumstances, for example 
– and distinguished from the subjective human experience of the treatment at the same 
time, making the assessment of whether it has been ‘diminished’ or otherwise attacked 
an objective question. As the Grand Chamber put it: 
 
Any interference with human dignity strikes at the very essence of the 
Convention… For that reason any conduct by law-enforcement officers vis-
à-vis an individual which diminishes human dignity constitutes a violation 
of Article 3 of the Convention. That applies in particular to their use of 
physical force against an individual where it is not made strictly necessary 
by his conduct, whatever the impact on the person in question.75  
 
Although the Court went on to indicate that ‘[a] slap has a considerable impact on the 
person receiving it’,76 the principle affirmed in Bouyid that physical force inflicted by 
a law-enforcement officer on a person entirely under his or her control – thus without 
the strict necessity of recourse to physical force – amounts to an attack on human 
dignity and thus to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3,77 elucidates what 
Article 3 proscribes. Article 3, which is an absolute right admitting of no derogation 
or exception, is not there purely to protect human beings from suffering certain forms 
of harm – rather, it proscribes certain forms of absolute wrongs, including but not 
isolated to wrongs which result in significant human suffering and other forms of 
harm.  
 
The concept of human dignity is central, as the Court recognises, to delimiting at least 
some of these wrongs, not least degrading treatment or punishment. Substantively, 
human dignity has two interwoven aspects which are relevant to these wrongs: one is 
chiefly tied to the principle of treating persons with a special kind of respect which 
distinguishes them from objects or non-human animals; the other relates to providing 
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or not denying the bare essentials required for human flourishing and personality 
development.78 Where a person is subjected to physical force not necessitated to repel 
her actions, she is treated as an object, without the minimum respect demanded by 
her humanity;79 where a person is imprisoned for life without a fragment of concretely 
realisable hope of release she is denied essential foundations for basic human 
flourishing.80 The case law reflects these ideas. In these instances, human dignity is 
attacked: the respect demanded by the elevated and equal moral status81 of all human 
beings is denied. In the Bouyid case, the Court recognises that the applicants were 
treated as objects in the control of the authorities: the objects of the police-officers’ 
temper, in a context of control which cast perpetrator and victim in profoundly 
unequal positions and rendered respect for the equal moral status of the applicants 
particularly vulnerable to the police-officers’ abuse of power. 
 
There is also something structurally significant about human dignity in the way that 
it (admittedly opaquely) informs the Court’s reasoning: attacks on human dignity 
constitute assaults on the collective human conscience that human rights are 
grounded in,82 and not purely attacks on the interests or well-being of a particular 
person. This explains the objective standards applicable to cases such as Bouyid – or, a 
much earlier predecessor, Tyrer v UK83 – in determining whether a particular 
treatment is degrading. In disrespecting the person as a human agent, the infliction of 
physical force by a police-officer against a person entirely within the police-officer’s 
control, and thus vulnerable to this police-officer’s acts, objectively offends human 
dignity in breach of Article 3, irrespective of how it is actually experienced. Thus, if a 
similar thing occurred against a particularly hardened criminal, it would objectively 
amount to an attack on human dignity in breach of Article 3 just the same.  
 
In Svinarenko, the Grand Chamber put it thus: 
 
Regardless of the concrete circumstances in the present case, the Court 
reiterates that the very essence of the Convention is respect for human 
dignity and that the object and purpose of the Convention as an instrument 
for the protection of individual human beings require that its provisions be 
interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards practical and effective. 
It is therefore of the view that holding a person in a metal cage during a 
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trial constitutes in itself – having regard to its objectively degrading nature 
which is incompatible with the standards of civilised behaviour that are the 
hallmark of a democratic society – an affront to human dignity in breach of 
Article 3.84  
 
The character of the treatment inflicted, constituting an objective wrong amounting to 
degradation irrespective of the nature and degree of harm it has resulted in, was 
missed by the dissenting judges in Bouyid, who instead went to great lengths to 
highlight that the minimum level of severity demanded for a finding of substantive 
breach of Article 3 has not been reached, largely because the ill-treatment was isolated 
and its concrete effects on the applicants were not significant or long-term. What they 
failed to appreciate is that it was the wrong committed against the applicants which 
reached the minimum level of severity, rather than the harm endured by them.85 
 
A final point worth making concerns the methodological critique launched by the 
dissent against the Court, to the effect that its general observations in Bouyid ‘failed’ 
to adopt the ex post facto, ‘all-things-considered’ approach normally favoured by the 
Court in Article 3 cases.86 Contrary to the position of the dissenting judges, I consider 
that the Court’s efforts to provide ex ante guidance on what amounts to a breach of 
Article 3 are to be welcomed both from a rule of law perspective, and in light of the 
fundamental importance of Article 3 as an absolute right. It is essential that the Grand 
Chamber offer guidance through rules on what is required and what is proscribed 
under Article 3, with a view to ensuring that it is respected rather than flouted. 
 
5. Concluding thoughts 
 
The search for the substantive contours of torture, inhumanity and degradation – ill-
treatment which is absolutely proscribed by Article 3 ECHR – is paved with challenges 
and contestation. There is no question that the ECtHR, which is charged with 
providing authoritative interpretation of these terms, could be doing a better job of 
this, through clearer and more coherent reasoning. Yet it is also important to highlight 
misplaced and misguided criticism. For example, to argue that certain ill-treatment of 
vulnerable persons at the hands of the police is frequent and therefore cannot be seen 
to be in breach of an absolute right is to jump from ‘is’ to ‘ought’ in a way which is 
both theoretically problematic in regard to human rights and prone to regressive 
implications. Moreover, suggesting that the harm-based approach to the ‘minimum 
level of severity’ threshold better captures the ‘nuances’ of the proscribed wrongs than 
the majority’s focus on human dignity, as the dissenting judges in Bouyid seemed to 
do, misses the real nuance of Article 3, which does not simply proscribe infliction of 
pain and suffering, but rather particular forms of wrongful inflictions of such pain or 
suffering.  
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At the same time, Bouyid represents an important moment in the ECtHR’s 
development of its Article 3 and, particularly, its human dignity-related case law. 
Given human dignity’s increasingly recognised centrality to Article 3, and arguably 
the whole of the Convention, the ECtHR must be bold enough to unpack its meaning 
and implications with regard to the human rights – and corresponding State wrongs 
– encapsulated in Article 3 and the ECHR more generally. 
 
